Instructions to Juries: A Survey of the General Field by Stone, Royal A.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 26 Issue 4 
January 1941 
Instructions to Juries: A Survey of the General Field 
Royal A. Stone 
Supreme Court of Minnesota 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Royal A. Stone, Instructions to Juries: A Survey of the General Field, 26 WASH. U. L. Q. 455 (1941). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume XXVI JUNE, 1941 Number 4
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES: A SURVEY OF
THE GENERAL FIELD*
ROYAL A. STONEf
THE JUDGE
Examination of the subject of instructions to juries, from the
standpoint of fundamentals, should begin with the author of
instructions, the judge himself. An incompetent judge shows at
his worst in charging a jury. The elimination of judicial incom-
petence is, in the main, a problem of selection. In Missouri, you
have taken a step in respect to judicial selection which has
focused upon you the spotlight of legal attention the country
over. It is the prevailing view of our profession that you have
adopted what, so far as we can now see, is the best plan thus
far devised for application to the judicial systems of those states-
wherein judges are elected. We are all watching you and wish
you success.
THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
The next step in consideration, it is submitted, should go to
the substantive law itself. It is the stuff of which instructions
are made. So far as possible, all hindrance to its understanding
and application by jurors should be removed.
There, in my judgment lies an important ingredient of today's
subject. It is an obstacle which is insurmountable without sub-
stantial changes in substantive law. A serious trouble with the
latter, for juries, is that too many of its rules lack realism and
are widely out of adjustment to the accomplishments of progress.
Some such rules never had more than artificial or fictional basis.
* An address delivered at a symposium on instructions to juries at
Washington University School of Law, June 6, 1941.
f Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Minnesota.
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At too many points, present in many ordinary run of court law-
suits, American common law is just impractical, if not unjust,
from the realistic, every day, common sense viewpoint of in-
telligent jurors.
Of that, there is no better illustration than the doctrine of
contributory negligence. Every lawyer of experience must know,
as does every judge who has presided over or reviewed the trial
of many negligence cases, that jurors are constantly applying
the rule of comparative, even though they have been mandatorily
instructed concerning that of contributory, negligence, and do
not know that there is such a legal notion as that of the com-
parative rule.
The point is that the doctrine of contributory negligence in
very many cases is just plainly out of line with the demands of
simple justice. Jurors refuse as matter of conscience to deny all
recovery to a badly hurt plaintiff, whose negligence in compari-
son with that of the almost unhurt defendant is relatively slight.
Even though they see plainly that the plaintiff was somewhat
careless, and that the want of care on his part has perceptibly
contributed to the result, yet, perceiving that the main fault lies
with the defendant, they justly hold that the latter shall pay
a substantial part of the resulting damage.
An anachronism of our law, in some states, is the rule that,
however formally the parties may proceed, a creditor cannot,
without new consideration, forgive his debtor part of a liquidated
debt, and upon payment of the residue acquit him finally. That
rule is so absurd that, however solemnly it is given a jury, they
are very apt to ignore it, and cannot be much blamed for doing
so.' The rule has been changed by statute in at least ten states.
Being a judge-made rule (it is said to have had its ancient source
in a reporter's error rather than a decision), no vested rights
,depending on it, judges are just as competent to get rid of it is
any legislature. The sooner they do so, the better it will be for
all concerned, particularly for the law itself.
It is fundamental in our law that liberty of contract shall be
unrestrained except as established public policy and statute im-
pose limitations upon it. Yet it is the rule that a creditor cannot
release one of several joint debtors without automatically releas-
1. It was "discarded" in Rye v. Phillips (1938) 203 Minn. 567, 282 N. W.
459.
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ing all the others. The theory is that by release of one he
discharges his cause of action against all. But, will you tell me
please, why it is not competent for the creditor in such case to
release one of his joint debtors, and at the same time expressly
reserve his cause of action against the others, with the only
result that his recovery against the latter is subject to reduction
by the amount received from the one acquitted of further lia-
bility?
A release is a contract. There is no statutory law against a
release of the sort just supposed. There is nothing in it against
public policy. The policy of the particular case, appraised from
any standpoint, will more often than not favor such a contract.
Yet our substantive law forbids it.
It doesn't stop there. It legitimizes that otherwise illegitimate
offspring of legal ingenuity known as the covenant not to sue.
In some future time, it may be safely predicted, that curiosity
will be labeled as a museum piece, preserved in the alcohol of
legal history, shelved and catalogued as one of the excrescent
fungi which formerly disfigured our law.
Suppose the creditor has covenanted not to sue one of his joint
debtors and, in violation of that covenant, he sues them all.
According to authority, the covenantee cannot interpose the
covenant as a defense in that action. He is relegated to the
remedy of an independent suit on the covenant. There is a prime
example of the circuity of action which, if a judge has occasion
to instruct concerning it, he will have difficulty in making clear
to a jury. And, if he does make it clear, you may imagine just
how far jurors will go in approving it and to what extent their
natural disapproval will tempt them to ignore and disobey the
instruction.
However unintended by the releasor, the effect of his release
of the joint tort feasor is given this anomalous reach. A is in
his person the victim of a tort committed by B. Without negli-
gence, A employs and is treated by Dr. X. In the course of that
treatment, A's injury is much aggravated by the malpractice of
Dr. X. In the meantime, A has settled with and released B. The
law is that he has thereby also released the doctor, albeit A in-
tended no such result and there is no reason in either sense or
ethics why that result should follow.
Under the lash of precedent, or the fear of it, I have written
1941]
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one of the pieces of judicial nonsense on that subject which mar
the reports.
2
The law's view of release of one of several joint debtors, par-
ticularly as. applied in such cases as that now supposed, illus-
trates the law's capacity to place pitfalls in the path of the un-
wary. 'Jurors have sympathy neither for them nor for the
unrealistic and unjust rules from which they result.
I hope you will not think that these references to substantive
law, and what seems to me to be the need for some drastic
changes in it, constitute a digression from the topic. I cannot so
consider them. If you do, my rejoinder is that instructions to
juries can be made satisfactory, workable and efficacious only in
proportion as they give to juries rules, against which the con-
science of the ordinary man and woman will not be in stubborn
and ethically well-founded rebellion.
If you care for an exercise in exact expression, try your hand
at writing an instruction which will make plain to a jury the
present law of joint tort feasors and release as it applies to our
hypothetical case of A, B, and Dr. X.
When that is done, fancy yourself a layman and a juror. Then
inquire of yourself concerning the justice of the release of Dr. X,
forced on the unwilling A, against both his intention and plain,
ethical right. Next ask yourself just how eager you would be,
as a juror, to avoid the release of B, on any ground at all.
Finally, if you care to go on, examine the numerous judicial
refinements of the doctrine of consideration in the law of con-
tracts. Ponder the extent to which "valuable consideration" is
overworked as a test of actionability. Weigh its propensity to
prevent obligation where obligation is intended and, in practice,
should result. In doing so, remember that "consideration" is
peculiar to English and American common law and wholly re-
pudiated by every other.
So long as our substantive law insists upon rules which, in
many cases, jurors will stubbornly refuse to apply, there is little
use in talking about the precise form of the instruction which
gives to them the objectionable doctrine.
The historical record of obstinate jurors is not all bad. London
has, or until recently, did have, a well deserved monument to one
group of them.
2. Smith v. Mann (1931) 184 Minn. 485, 239 N. W. 223.
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PRESUMPTIONS
One wide and oft-used avenue for a jury's disobedience of the
law of a case is an instruction giving them liberty to indulge in
presumption. A subject which has filled volumes of legal treatise
and still is in process of settlement by, and remains a topic of
pronounced disagreement in, the profession will seldom be cor-
rectly appraised and applied by a jury.
There is general and increasing agreement that presumptions
should not be given to the jury. From that statement should be
excepted, for criminal cases, the presumption of innocence, which
is in a category by itself. Whatever theory of presumptions is
accepted for their treatment in the law of evidence, they are in
no proper sense evidence, and so there should be no attempt to
instruct concerning them as presumptions.
There is some authority that presumptions are evidence. The
weight of judicial conclusion and the reason of the matter are
the other way.3 If a presumption is not evidence, why should it
go to the jury for any purpose? A negative answer is compelled
if the presumption is given its proper weight and no more. The
function of a presumption, as shown first by Thayer and later
by Wigmore,4 is solely to control decision on a group of unop-
posed facts. Decision in such case is controlled by a rule of law.
That is the true and limited function of any presumption other
than those which are conclusive. It controls rather than permits
decision.
The rebuttable presumption is properly appraised as a mere
procedural device compelling decision on certain unopposed facts,
or for allocation of the burden of going on with evidence. That
view has long been widely held and now has the support of
preponderant authority. Recently it was adopted by the Supreme
Court of the United States.5
There is authority authorizing submission of a presumption to
aid the jury if they find the evidence in doubt or equipoise.6 But
in such case, is it not the jury's duty to find for the negative, the
3. Annotation, 103 A. L. R. 185.
4. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1st ed. 1898) 339; 5 Wig-
more, Evidence (2d. ed. 1923) 449-453, secs. 2490-2491.
5. New York Life Ins. Co. v. James (1938) 303 U. S. 161.
6. Annotation, 103 A. L. R. 185, 191. This whole discussion of presump-
tions is but a repetition of what is said in Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. (1939) 206 Minn. 562, 289 N. W. 557, discussed in Note (1940) 24 Minn.
L. Rev. 651.
1941]
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affirmative not having produced that preponderance of evidence
necessary for decision in its favor? To instruct them that by
use of a presumption they may tip for the affirmative a scale,
otherwise in balance, is to allow them to base decision upon some-
thing which is not evidence. There being no legitimate purpose
to be served by an instruction allowing a jury to give weight to
a presumption as of law, in addition to the facts upon which it
is based, it seems logically improper and practically indefensible.
The jury gets all the facts. Theirs is the exclusive function of
reasonable inference therefrom. In addition, they should not get,
ready-made, a deduction to which they are authorized to attach
independent and added probative value. To allow that would be
to assign evidentiary value to something which is not evidence.
Where a presumption prevents a case from going to a jury,
it is because the facts under the law permit of but one decision.
If the issue reaches the jury, it is because the evidence will sup-
port a verdict either way. That much the judge decides as matter
of law. In doing so, he determines no issue of fact. All he does
is to say as matter of law that there is an issue of fact. That
being so, it should go to the jury on the evidence for their own
inferences, to be drawn without artificial aid of any suggestion
by the judge that the law has one, ready-made, to which they
may give independent probative value.
In my own view, there is one situation wherein it would not be
error for a judge to instruct, not that any presumption should
control, but that on a stated condition the jury should make a
definite finding. To illustrate: The evidence of suicide may con-
sist wholly of testimony which the jury may discredit. In such
a case, it would seem proper to charge them that, if they did
reject all such evidence it would be their duty under the law to
find the death accidental. That would be by reason of the pre-
sumption against suicide, as rule of law, operating on unopposed
facts. The discredited evidence rejected, the presumption is
brought into operation, not as evidence but as law controlling
decision. It may be suggested in passing that a judge trying a
case without a jury should use the ordinary, rebuttable presump-
tion in just that fashion.
In proportion as rebuttable presumptions, other than of inno-
cence, are not mentioned to a jury, will their task be simplified
and the probability of error and unjust verdict be lessened. To
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss4/3
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the extent that juries are given liberty by instructions to use
presumptions as evidence, they are invited to arrive at a verdict
by processes other than that of impartial appraisal of real evi-
dence.
JURORS
I cannot agree with those who assume that all jurors are
"dumb" or oblivious to the solemn obligation of their oaths as
jurors. My memory recalls many jurors who were anxious not
only to hear, but also to understand and apply, every word con-
cerning the law of the case given them by the judge.
In my personal experience as a trial lawyer, I have had con-
vincing evidence (it was sometimes devastating) that the charge
of the judge settled the whole matter for the jury. Furthermore,
some of us in Minnesota think that the ladies who serve on our
juries have for the most part been inclined, more than their
masculine associates, to apply the law exactly as given by the
judge.
More comment along this line would lead into the related
problem of selection of jurors, with which we are now only in-
cidentally concerned. My whole submission postulates that jurors
are selected with reasonable care; that those who are obviously
unfit are rejected; and that the result is a jury of at least average
intelligence and normal disposition to abide by their oaths, and
in consequence do their duty as sworn triers of fact in a court
of justice.
W/RITTEN AND ORAL INSTRUCTIONS
Your kind indulgence is now invoked and will be needed. I
am but a provincial judge, all my experience both as advocate
and on the bench much confined to practice in a state which in
all respects (other than college football) is at least a generation
nearer frontier conditions than the great commonwealth in
which it is my privilege now to appear. Circumstance compels
me to draw upon that experience for such narrative and con-
clusions as are now offered. To the extent that they meet with
your disapproval, you will appreciate and allow for the measure
in which they are the result of the limitations imposed by my
confining matrix of experience and ability.
In Minnesota, we have long been the advocates of "written
instructions." But the fact is that we provincials at the head-
waters of the Mississippi simply do not know what written in-
structions are.
19411
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In our district, corresponding to your circuit courts, the record
of a jury trial, including the charge, is stenographically recorded,
and transcribed if there is an appeal. Juries may and occasion-
ally do return to the court room asking to have some portion of
the charge read again, or for additional instructions. If given,
a record is made. Counsel need not be present. If they are not,
their right to except is saved.
Our experience is that the trial judge who reduces his instruc-
tions to writing, a process conducive to care, is in the long run
more apt to escape reversal than the one who does not resort
to that labor before charging the jury.
It is not true that mere "writing maketh an exact man." But
careful writing, with rewriting until the wanted expression is
as plain and in as few words as possible, does characterize and
tend to produce the exact lawyer or judge.
My own practice was begun before the Honorable Calvin L.
Brown, then on the district bench in western Minnesota, where
he served for a long time. Later and for a longer period he was
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota. Always, with-
out exception, he wrote his charge in longhand. He then read it
to the jury, impressively but with no undue stress on any of its
parts. If the occasion seemed to require, he included appropriate
admonitions, as distinguished from instructions.
He was never reversed for an error in a charge. What is
more important, he seldom was confronted by an appeal wherein
error was assigned as to any portion of his instructions. (That
a trial judge is seldom challenged by appeal is a much greater
tribute to the quality of his work than whatever record he may
make in respect to reversal or affirmance.) I have always
thought, and those who knew Judge Brown agree with me, that
the admirable record of his instructions was due to the extreme
care with which he reduced them to writing. If need be, he
would let jurors and counsel wait while he put his charge in
the precise form in which he thought it should be.
That is what, "up north," we have always considered the
written charge, as distinguished from the oral one. That notion
is erroneous, a confession made now so that none of you may
feel under any compulsion to prove the error.
From your standpoint, all our instructions are oral. But they
are stenographically transcribed and the record made as com-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss4/3
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pletely and accurately, given a competent reporter, as though
they had been in the form of your written instructions.
With us, the arguments of counsel come before the charge.
I have seen many a bombastic advocate completely deflated by
a dignified judge, speaking accurately the language of a man-
date of law.
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS
It is our permissive but not required practice to submit, at the
close of the evidence and before arguments of counsel, written
requests for instructions. Ordinarily, that is done only in the
unusual or complicated case. But counsel who on appeal assigns
as error an omission to instruct on any point is in hard luck if
he has not requested a correct instruction concerning it.
In charging a jury, Minnesota judges are apt to be altogether
on their own. They know it and conduct themselves accordingly.
At that point, the Supreme Court in Minnesota has had occa-
sion to apply some corrective influence. We have never reversed
because a trial judge, in the course of his charge, said that cer-
tain instructions were given at the request of one party or the
other. But it is safe to say that now only a novice on our bench
would make the mistake (we would so consider it) of giving an
instruction with any intimation that it was at the request of
either party.
For what it may be worth, here, in the words of Mr. Justice
Loring, is what I hope may be the last utterance of our court
upon this subject :7
Before passing to the consideration of this charge, we
wish to express our disapproval of the action of some trial
courts in announcing, as was done in this case, that any por-
tion of the charge is given by request of either party. A
requested charge should be given only when the trial court
approves of and adopts as its own the law contained in the
request, and it should preferably be incorporated in the
appropriate part of the body of the charge so as not to
destroy its symmetry.
Your supreme court is of another view. An assignment of
error, predicated on a judge's stating to the jury that he gives
stated instructions at the request of a party to the case, is here
considered "simply frivolous."'
7. Carlson v. Sanitary Farm Dairies (1937) 200 Minn. 177, 273 N. W.
665.
8. State v. Gatlin (1902) 170 Mo. 354, 70 S. W. 885, 891.
1941]
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The office of instructions is to declare the law of the case. It
is given to jurors because it is the law, and not because it is
the idea of the law entertained by partisan advocates. That
being so, what justification can there be, in the reason of the
matter, for an intimation from the judge that what he is saying
to a jury concerning the law is anything other than his own
statement of it?
In proportion as instructions are permitted to have any, even
the slightest, appearance of coming from a source other than the
court, may they not take on for the jury the aspect of argument
rather than law and by so much invite disobedience or disregard?
In charging a jury, the judge speaks with sovereign authority.
Pro tempore, he is oracle of the law. Why let it appear that
what he says of it has any other source or a lesser sanction than
that of sovereign law?
One question more. However much one may advocate the
common law, adversary scheme of jury trial, must he not admit
that when the evidence is in and the arguments of counsel sub-
mitted, it is time for a neutral spokesman of the law itself to
take over and speak in terms of impartial analysis and direc-
tion? At that point, certainly, the adversary features should
end and, from there on, the proceeding be, in process and result,
neutral and impartial. It cannot be that, or at least is likely
not to be, in proportion as anything of the earlier and adversary
elements are permitted to remain.
It is respectfully submitted also that, in proportion as judges
are permitted to look to counsel for both form and substance of
instructions, they may on occasion be tempted to shirk the re-
sponsibility which is theirs. On the other hand, by the measure
in which responsibility for instructions, not only sound in sub-
stance but also simple and accurate in form, is put exclusively
upon the mental shoulders of judges, will they have added in-
centive to maintain the ideal which the law sets for them. A
judge's habitual dependence upon counsel for the whole, or even
much of his instructions, will not stimulate his juridical meta-
bolism.
ADMONITIONS AND COMMENT ON EVIDENCE
Admonitions, as distinguished from instructions, have their
proper place in many a charge. They are not only useful but
frequently necessary to proper understanding by jurors of their
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss4/3
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duty. No judge should be loath to resort to them in a proper
case. That is particularly true where he is dealing with a panel,
some of the members of which are having their first experience
as jurors.
Beyond that, I am utterly out of sympathy with the notion
that a judge is guilty of impropriety, to say nothing of reversible
error, in commenting upon evidence so long as he says that it
is for the jury to determine the truth, and makes it clear that
they will fail in their duty in proportion as they omit to do so
by the use of their own faculties and independent opinions rather
than those of anyone else, counsel or judge.
No one may reasonably suggest that it is not the province of
the judge clearly to define the issues. Not only that, it is his
duty fearlessly, if the evidence has made an issue one of law,
to say so and himself decide it accordingly, telling the jury that,
whether they like it or not, they must take his decision and
abide by it in their consideration of the other issues.
Too often, reversals come because where several issues are
submitted to a jury, one of them either should not have been
submitted at all, because it is out of the case or should have
been disposed of by the judge as one of law.
Beyond all that, there is a broad area wherein the judge,
more experienced than any juror as an appraiser of evidence,
may go far in assuring a just result by appropriate and wholly
legitimate comment on evidence. In proportion as many of our
states enforce a different rule, it is my deferential submission
that they are in error, and that by so much they have amended
the common law rules of trial by jury to an undesirable extent,
one which in many cases has spelled disaster for justice itself.
Either a judge should be competent to discharge the common
law duties of his office, or he should not occupy it.
One does not hear any other than sporadic criticism of our
federal district judges concerning their comment on evidence
while instructing juries. And when you do find any, investiga-
tion will disclose, nine times out of ten, that it comes from justly
worsted counsel.
I have known judges who on occasion have abused their power
to comment on evidence. One reversal for such an abuse is
ordinarily enough to prevent its recurrence. In these days an
added remedy is becoming available. I refer to an integrated
and class conscious bar, to lawyers as officers of courts, inclu-
19411
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sively organized to protect, and on all proper occasions to assert,
their own rights as such officers. With a bar fully integrated
and alert both to its rights and its duties, I cannot see how any
state judge, even though his tenure be for good behavior, would
much or long permit himself to overstep the bounds of -propriety
in commenting on evidence.
In that connection, the judicial council is not to be ignored.
If it performs properly its duty as inspector general of the ad-
ministration of justice, no judge will be guilty of much repetition
of impropriety. It has in its hands the weapon of publicity. It
will speak with authority. In cooperation with an integrated bar,
its corrective process should be quick and efficient.
The greatest evil today, in our courts, is perjury, too often
both obvious and successful. The most efficacious remedy is
prosecution and condign punishment. No judge, convinced that
provable perjury has been committed in his presence should
hesitate for a single moment after verdict to instruct the prose-
cuting attorney to investigate. There will be little perjury before
a judge with a reputation for that sort of swift action.
The next best method of combatting perjury is by proper and
timely comment on evidence by the trial judge. His errors are
susceptible of correction. Those of the jury too often are not.
IN CONCLUSION
Before this audience, it is almost supererogation to stress the
need for putting instructions into easily understandable English.
It will be such in proportion as it is orderly and simple. Foreign
wvords or phrases are out of place. Even English words with
Greek or Latin roots should give way, wherever possible, to
synonyms of Northern European origin. Once, with an upcountry
witness, I was having difficulty in getting him to say which of
two events was "prior" to the other. The trouble lay in that
Latin word "prior." When its middle English equivalent, "be-
fore," was substituted, understanding and answer were quick.
A charge is no proper hanger for the ornaments of oratory or
classical appendage. Its intelligibility and effect depend to a
substantial degree upon the orderly arrangement of its proposi-
tions. As Judge Seth Thomas said, in speaking before the
Judicial Conference of the Eighth Circuit at Kansas City in
January of 1940:9
9. (1940) 1 F. R. D .141.
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Symmetry is as necessary to legal exposition for easy un-
derstanding as it is to literary exposition in any form.
It is in order here to inquire why instructions may not be, and
why in practice they are not, standardized in form and sub-
stance, to a greater extent than they are. In California it has
been attempted, with apparent success, in Los Angeles County.10
With standardized instructions, a judge should have less
trouble than too many seem to have now. He would remain,
however, under the same duty by illustration and explanation
to make clear their proper application to the facts, as the jury
may find them to be.
Lest it be thought that they are ignored, two more factors are
mentioned. The first is that appellate courts, insofar as they
have not done so, should subject themselves to a self-imposed
rule against attenuation of technicality and refinement in finding
error. Or if error be present, let them forego reversal by the
process of imagining a prejudice which realistic consideration
cannot even suggest.
Finally, let us all remember that rules of law must, in ex-
pression, be arbitrary and somewhat inflexible. A main justifi-
cation of trial by jury is its ability to soften somewhat the law's
rigor, and to introduce a quality of practical adaptability, not
otherwise attainable, to the kaleidoscopic facts of litigation.
After all, are not the two main prerequisites of proper in-
structions to be found in the competence of the judge and the
quality of the law of which he is the voice? With proper atten-
tion to them, will not all that is desirable follow as matter of
course?
It is so submitted; and that in proportion as stress is placed
accordingly will be achieved the ideal for which we strive. If
your effort of today is continued and becomes general, the error,
if any, will not consist in whatever of failure may disappoint,
but in whatever of faulty aim may contribute to such lack of
success as there may be.
10. Palmer, Standardized Jury Instructions Succeed (1940) 23 J. Am.
Jud. Soc. 177.
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